USA v. Weingold by unknown
2003 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-23-2003 
USA v. Weingold 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Weingold" (2003). 2003 Decisions. 350. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003/350 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2003 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 01-4487
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
vs.
HAROLD WEINGOLD,
Appellant.
___________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Criminal No. 98-cr-00483-1)
District Judge:  The Honorable Nicholas H. Politan
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 23, 2003
BEFORE: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed               July 23, 2003                                        )
___________
2OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Appellant, Harold P. Weingold, was convicted of mail fraud, tax evasion,
perjury, and subscribing to a false tax return, and sentenced to a total of 63 months in
prison.  On appeal Weingold alleges that the government’s Brady violation, upon which
the District Court dismissed several counts of the indictment, also entitles him to
dismissal of the remaining mail fraud counts.  Second, Weingold alleges that the District
Court erred by admitting communications between him and his attorneys into evidence
under the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege.  Third, he argues that the
District Court erred by denying him access to Grand Jury transcripts.  Fourth, he asserts
that he is entitled to a new trial on the basis of cumulative errors.  Finally, he alleges an
Apprendi violation because the District Court did not submit all the sentencing factors to
a jury for determination.  Because we find that the District Court neither abused its
discretion, nor erred in its legal conclusions, we will affirm.  
I. 
The parties to this case, counsel, and the District Court are all familiar with
the facts and procedure of this case.  As we are writing a non-precedential opinion and
only for the parties herein, we will recite only such facts necessary to our holding. 
Through numerous entities, Weingold perpetrated several fraudulent direct mail schemes
3in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.  Generally, the schemes involved mass market
solicitation offering psychic predictions promising specific amounts of money;
guaranteed lottery winning devices; entry into lottery pools; trinkets purported to be
religiously or spiritually significant; and “final delivery notices,” which suggested to
individuals that they had ordered something and forgotten about it, and could receive their
goods by paying a postage fee.  
In addition, Weingold rented mailing lists of those individuals who had
responded to his solicitations, but did not report this income on his tax return in violation
of 26 U.S.C. §7201.  The conviction for subscribing to a false tax return, violating 26
U.S.C. 7206(1), stemmed from Weingold’s signing and filing a misstated corporate tax
return for a company he owned.  Weingold had deposited $400,000 with the company but
failed to include it in the tax return.  The perjury conviction was based on Weingold’s
false statements to the court in a preceding federal civil action in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1623.  
II.  
We address Weingold’s issues seriatim:
1.
 “There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at
issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is
impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or
4inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,
281–82 (1999).   The issue is whether the government committed a Brady violation by not
turning over information that a prosecution witness had pleaded nolo contendere to
possession of marijuana.  The Court found that the government violated the first and
second part of Brady by failing to turn this information over to the defense.  App. at 122. 
The Court then went on to consider whether favorable evidence was “material” and
whether it impacted the defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial.  Id. at 123.
Based on the Brady violation, the Court dismissed eight counts of the
superseding indictment related to perjury and subornation of perjury, because the witness
was the sole witness for those charges and because the “evidence of her prior arrest,
coupled with her initial denial of ever being accused of possessing marijuana, goes
straight to her credibility, and thus right at the heart of the perjury charges.”  Id. at 124. 
Weingold moved to dismiss the remaining perjury count and mail fraud counts against
him, and the Court denied the motion as to both.  The District Court found that the Brady
violation was not material to either count noting, “[t]here is more than sufficient evidence
far away from that and, frankly, it doesn’t go to the essence of the charges [of fraud and
tax evasion].”  Id. at 127.  
Weingold argues that the District Court should have also dismissed the mail
fraud counts as well.   The only question here is whether the Brady violation was
“material.” “The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
5evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.”  United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
Here, the evidence was disclosed to Weingold during his trial, so the
question is whether the delay prevented Weingold from effectively using the evidence in
his defense, as it relates to the mail fraud charges.  See United States v. Walsh, 75 F.3d 1,
8 (3d Cir. 1996).  Weingold’s codefendant used the evidence of prior conviction to
impeach the witness in open court.  Supp. App. at 616–17.  In addition, Weingold had the
opportunity, but chose to not cross examine the witness.  Id. at 618.  There is some
question, therefore, whether Brady is even implicated here.  See e.g., United States v.
Juvenile Male, 864 F.2d 641, 647 (9th Cir. 1988) (“No violation occurs if the evidence is
disclosed to the defendant at a time when the disclosure remains of value.”); United
States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 1984).  Assuming arguendo that the first
two prongs of Brady are met, we nevertheless agree with the District Court that there was
no prejudicial effect as to the mail fraud counts.  In light of the government’s additional
evidence of Weingold’s guilt, there is no reasonable probability that earlier disclosure of
the evidence in question would have resulted in a different outcome.  
2.  
1 Weingold’s attorneys, Michael Levine and Richard Dembia, were included in the
original indictment.  All charges against Levine and Dembia were eventually dismissed.
6
Weingold employed counsel to review many of his fraudulent solicitations. 
Three opinion letters sent from Weingold’s attorney, Michael Levine,1 discussing the
solicitations, were introduced into evidence under the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege.  We read Weingold’s argument concerning his attorneys to
challenge the District Court’s admission of these letters.  The crime-fraud exception
applies where legal advice “gives direction for the commission of future fraud or crime.” 
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2000).  To invoke the exception,
the government must show that the client was committing or intending to commit a fraud
or crime, and that the attorney-client communications were in furtherance of that alleged
crime or fraud.  Id. This “prima facie showing requires presentation of evidence which, if
believed by the fact-finder, would be sufficient to support a finding that the elements of
the crime-fraud exception were met.”  Id. (internal citation omitted).  
Weingold argues that Levine would have to have been a party to the scheme
for the communications to have been in furtherance of the scheme.  Contrary to
Weingold’s suggestion, the dismissal of charges against Levine does not change the
analysis of the crime-fraud exception.  “[W]hen the lawyer is consulted, not with respect
to past wrongdoing but to future illegal activities, the privilege is no longer defensible and
the crime-fraud exception comes into play.”  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d
798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979).  Moreover, “the privilege may be denied even if the lawyer is
7altogether innocent.”  Id.  Reviewing the record, we conclude that the District Court did
not err by admitting the letters into evidence.  
3.  
Weingold’s third claim is “the prosecutorial abuses that have occurred
require disclosure of all grand jury transcripts.”  Weingold had moved the District Court
for an order to review the transcripts of the grand jury proceedings.  The District Court
denied this motion.  “To support a motion for a judicially ordered disclosure of grand jury
testimony, a party must show a particularized need for that information which outweighs
the public interest in secrecy.”  United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 289 (3d Cir.
1988).  We review a District Court’s decision regarding the release of grand jury
transcripts for abuse of discretion.  Id.  Weingold has not carried his burden of showing a
particularized need for the grand jury transcripts, and the District Court did not abuse its
discretion.  As the District Court noted, Weingold’s request for the grand jury transcripts
was simply “a fishing expedition by the defendant.”  App. at 172.   
4. 
The District Court denied Weingold’s Rule 33 motion for a new trial.  App.
at 171–72.  Weingold argues that it is the cumulative effect of the errors in this trial that
entitle him to a new trial.  However, as we have discussed above, the District Court did
not err.  Neither did the Court abuse its discretion in denying Weingold’s Rule 33 motion. 
Therefore, we also reject this argument.  
85.  
At the sentencing hearing, Weingold argued that under Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the amount of loss had to be presented to the jury for proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.  App. at 247–48.  The District Court ruled that the amount of
loss was proved beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of the evidence presented
at trial.  Id. at 259.  Apprendi is not implicated in this case because the District Court did
not sentence Weingold beyond the statutory range.  
Weingold was convicted of ten counts of mail fraud, which were grouped
together for sentencing, and four counts related to tax evasion and subscribing to a false
return, which were grouped together.  The statutory maximum for mail fraud is five years. 
18 U.S.C. §1341.  The maximum for perjury is also five years.  18 U.S.C. §1623. Tax
evasion and subscribing to a false tax return each has a maximum sentence of three years. 
26 U.S.C. §7206.  Weingold’s sentence of 63 months does not exceed the aggregate
sentence available of the counts for which he was sentenced.  See United States v.
Parmelee, 319 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2003).  
III.  
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the order of the District Court.  
9_________________________
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
                /s/ Richard L. Nygaard
_________________________________
Circuit Judge

